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RES IPSA LOQUITUR IN OHIO -
DOES ANY "THING" OR "CONTROL" SPEAK FOR ITSELF?
NoRMAN S. CARR*
The author reviews recent developments involving res ipsa
loquitur, illuminates uncertainties which accompany the doc-
trine and suggests consideration of the separate "duty of con-
trol" standard as an alternative approach in certain fact situa-
tions which frequently arise.
I. INTRODUCTION
Res ipsa loquitur is a classic negligence doctrine which dates
back to the 19th century.' The general statement of the doctrine
in Ohio appears in the case of Fink v. New York Cent. R.R.:2
In Ohio the rule of res ipsa loquitur is not a rule of substantive
law but is a rule of evidence which permits the jury, but not
the court in a jury trial, to draw an inference of negligence
where the instrumentality causing the injury was under the
exclusive management and control of the defendant and the
accident occurred under such circumstances that in the ordinary
course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary care
had been observed.3
As the Fink syllabus states, res ipsa loquitur establishes an in-
ference of negligence, and when the inference is properly raised, it
normally requires that the case be submitted to the jury.4 The
doctrine is important for both parties since once a trial court
determines that res ipsa loquitur applies, with rare exceptions, a
directed verdict for the defendant may not be granted; the weight
and effect of the inference is generally for the jury alone. The re-
quirement of exclusive management and control set forth in the
Fink case is not unique to Ohio. It is, however, "Perhaps the most
important of the factual elements warranting application of the
rule . . .,,
The purpose of this article is to review recent developments,
particularly in Ohio, which involve res ipsa loquitur, and analyze
areas in which substantial uncertainty continues to exist. The main
areas of discussion are as follows: (1) What does the "exclusive
* Member of the law firm Brouse, McDowell, May, Bicrce & Wortman, Akron,
Ohio.
1 Byrne v. Boadle, 2 H & C 722, 159 Eng. Rep. R. 299 (Exch. 1863).
2 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E.2d 456 (1944).
3 Id. at 1, 56 N.E.2d at 457 (Syllabus 2).
4 Id. at 2, 56 N.E.2d at 457 (Syllabus 3).
-5 Knepper, Pleading in Res Ipsa Loquitur Cases, 23 Onto ST. L.J. 450, 451 (1962).
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management and-control" provision of res ipsa loquitur require a
plaintiff to establish and, conversely, what factors, if any, must be
excluded?6 (2) Is there a consistent body of case law establishing
a uniform meaning for "exclusive control"? (3) If not, may the
uncertainties in this area be avoided by reliance on case law dealing
with general standards of negligence rather than this unique infer-
ence? (4) May a plaintiff plead specific acts of negligence, in
addition to the general averments which invoke the desired infer-
ence of res ipsa loquitur? (5) May a trial court charge the jury
jointly on res ipsa loquitur and (specific) negligence or must plain-
tiff elect before the case is submitted to the jury?
II. EXCLUSIVE MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL-OHIO CASES
The most serious Current res ipsa loquitur problem in Ohio is
the requirement of exclusive management and control. Since exclu-
sive control of the particular instrumentality must be established
to invoke res ipsa loquitur, it is incumbent upon the participants
in the judical process to predict with reasonable frequency whether
exclusive control will be a problem in any given area. Unfortun-
ately, Ohio authorities in, the field are contradictory and necessitate
a case-by-ease review in order to impart reasonable comprehension.
The certainty of stare decisis and the force, of social change have
met and locked horns over exclusive control. Reconciliation of this
confrontation has not yet been, realized.:
In reviewing exclusive control cases in Ohio, three general
questions should be kept in mind. Can the plaintiff, (1) prove
what actually happened, (2) establish exclusive control and man-
agement consistent with the standards imposed by the Supreme
Court of Ohio, and (3) develop a theory of negligence not depend-
ent upon exclusive control?
If plaintiff can show what occurred the res ipsa loquitur doc-
trine is not necessary but may be attractive since it generally
requires submission of the case to the jury. Conversely, since the
existence of an exclusive control problem means that the application
of res ipsa loquitur in a particular fact situation is doubtful in
Ohio, other approaches and precedents should be considered. The
modern judicial interpretation of the requirements for exclusive
control began in Ohio in the late 1940's with the case of Renneckar
v. The Canton Terminal Restaurant, Inc.,7 which was followed
by Soltz v. Colony Recreation Center8 and Koktavy v. United Fire-
6 144 Ohio St. 1, 56 N.E.2d 456, 457 (1944) (Syllabus 2).
7 148 Ohio St. 119, 73 N.E.2d 498 (1947).
8 151 Ohio St. 503, 87 N.E2d 167 (1949).
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works Mfg. Co.;9 all three cases should be considered together.
In these cases, the trial courts directed a verdict for the defend-
ant and determined, as a matter of law, that res ipsa loquitur did
not apply. Three different courts of appeal reversed, but the Ohio
Supreme Court in turn reversed the appellate courts and held that
res ipsa loquitur did not apply. Rather obviously, this process did
not involve a liberalization of the requirements of exclusive control.
This should be borne in mind because there are statements in later
opinions that attempt to harmonize the earlier decisions with cur-
rent ones. This goal is not attainable, for Renneckar, Soltz and
Koktavy are conservative and consistent decisions. If stare decisis
were to be rigidly followed, the law of exclusive control was clearly
established in Ohio by 1954.
In Renneckar, plaintiff, entering a bus terminal, stepped into
a manhole near the entrance to the terminal. Judge Zimmerman,
speaking for a unanimous court, held that res ipsa loquitur did
not apply since the manhole cover was in a public sidewalk and the
defendant merely subleased the space beneath it. Thus defendant
did not exclusively control the source of injury. Syllabus 2 of the
decision states that, "Res ipsa loquitur does not apply... where it
is apparent that the displacement could have been due as well to the
intervention of an outside force or of a third person as to any
negligence of the defendant."'10 The case generally restates the
Fink rule with reference to the application of res ipsa loquitur in
Ohio.'-
In Soltz a fire damaged the plaintiffgs building. At the time of
the fire, the defendants occupied a portion of the basement in which
they operated bowling alleys, and a fire originated in a room in
their portion of the building. At that time, two employees of the
defendants were alone in this room and were refinishing bowling
pins. This process involved the use of an inflammable liquid.12
Notwithstanding the defendant's close involvement with the sources
of potential danger at the time of the fire, the court ruled that
this was not a proper case in which to invoke res ipsa loquitur.
Judge Taft, as spokesman for the court commented that, "It is
well known that fires are of uncertain origin and may result from
many causes other than negligence."13 This would seem to pre-
9 160 Ohio St. 461, 117 N.E.2d 16 (1954).
10 148 Ohio St. 119, 73 N.E.2d 498 (1947) (Syllabus 2).
11 Id. at 119, 73 N.E.2d at 498 (Syllabus 1).
12 151 Ohio St. 504, 87 N.E2.d at 168.
1s Id. at 512, 87 N.E.2d at 172.
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clude the application of res ipsa loquitur to virtually any fire case
in Ohio. A fire of certain origin would not necessitate res ipsa
loquitur, and a fire of uncertain origin would not establish exclu-
sive control on behalf of the defendant.
In Koktavy an aerial bomb exploded two months after the
defendant, a wholesale supplier, delivered it to a retail jobber
who then stored it in a warehouse. This case, by any standard,
would appear difficult for the claimant. The supreme court, with
one judge dissenting, 14 declined to invoke res ipsa loquitur. The
decision contains interesting and important language. Syllabus 1
states that, "Ordinarily, the rule of res ipsa loquitur is not applicable
... unless such party had exclusive possession, control and manage-
ment of the instrumentality at the time it caused the injury."' 5
(Emphasis added.) The requirement of possession is new and
would seem to further minimize the use of the doctrine in cases
where the defendant does not directly control all factors relating
to the instrumentality at the time the event occurs. However, the
use of the term "ordinarily" is also new and, as will be demon-
strated, it implied the existence of an exception to the general
rule which was adopted by the court in Schafer v. Wells.'0 One
appellate court termed Koktavy "A major change in Ohio Law,"
and stated that Syllabus 1 "was in contrast to the usual Ohio state-
ment that exclusive control and management by the defendant was
required."'17 To this writer, it appears entirely consistent with its
predecessors.
Koktavy was followed by Schafer v. Wells. After the decision
in the latter case, the meaning of exclusive control in Ohio is
unclear. Schafer, like Soltz, involved a fire. The defendant had been
engaged in repairing plaintiff's oil furnace which was on the plain-
tiff's property. The defendant completed the repairs and left plain-
tiff's premises at 4:00 p.m. At 5:30 p.m., the building was discovered
to be on fire. The plaintiff's garage, where the fire occurred was
open to easy access through a doorway (having no door) and a
window opening (containing no window). Irrespective of plaintiff's
14 Judge Zimmerman's dissent does not establish any new or different standards.
Compare Judge Zimmerman's statement, 160 Ohio St. 461, 471, 117 N.E.2d 16, 22,
(1954) "that plaintiff traced with a satisfactory degree of thoroughness, the history of
the bomb" with Syllabus 2 of the court which stated that the absense of nonacccss
evidence was fatal.
15 Id. at 461, 117 N.E.2d at 16.
16 171 Ohio St. 506, 172 N.E.2d 708 (1961).




testimony that no one entered the garage after defendant's departure,
the problem of nonexclusive control and management of the source
of danger, as raised in Koktavy, would seem formidable. Neverthe-
less, the court held, by a four to three majority, that res ipsa
loquitur applied and reinstated a verdict for plaintiff which had
been promulgated by the lower court. Judge Herbert reasoned
for the majority that the term "ordinarily" as used in Kokiavy, "did
not require continuing 'control and management' between that
of the defendant and the cause of the injury."' 8 Judge Taft succinctly
pointed out in his dissent that this case appeared to be controlled
by Soltz. Indeed, his dissent went so far as to state that an
inference of negligence "would have been far more justifiable"1
in Soltz than in Schafer.
As a matter of case uniformity, the dissent was undoubtedly
correct. The fire in Schafer was as uncertain in origin as the fire in
Soltz. But many writers in the tort field had seen fit to criticize
what they believed to be an overstrict interpretation of exclusive
control.20 Harper and James, Prosser, and the then contemplated
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS2 1 would all be in accord with the
majority decision in Schafer, and it is likely that this factor influ-
enced the court.
It is not surprising that the cases following Schafer have done
little to clarify this subject. The gap between the consistent, con-
servative (i.e., inconsistent with Prosser and with Harper and
James) predecessors of Schafer and any desired liberalization of
exclusive control is so wide that any attempt to rely on stare decisis,
absent an agreement by the entire court to reverse earlier precedent,
would necessarily create confusion. One commentator has perhaps
understated the matter in commenting that Schafer
is generally in accord with the view taken in other jurisdictions
on the issue of control. However, it does appear to apply the
rule of exclusive control somewhat less strictly than some of the
earlier cases in Ohio.22
Although there have been several important cases decided
since Schafer, no consistent pattern is apparent to date. In Huggins
I8 171 Ohio St. 506, 512, 172 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1961).
19 Id. at 517, 172 N.E.2d 715.
20 See 2 F. HAmPE & F. JANErs, THE LAW oF ToTs 19.7 (1956) [Hereinafter
cited as HARPER AND JAM s]; RETAT'tNT (SECOND) oF Tor$ § ,28D (1966) [Herein-
after dted as REsrATEMiET 2D]; AV. PRossER, ToRTs 39 (3rd ed. 1964) [Hereinafter
cited as FROSSER].
21 Id.
22 Knepper, supra note 5, at 453.
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v. Morrell& Co.23 . a unanimous courtheld that res ipsa loquitur
didnot apply to litigation involving the bottling of pigs feet, where
the 'jar in question had passed through 'the possession and control
of a series of defendants. The court again had to reverse a court of
appeals 'and reinstate the decision' of the lower court which had
sustained a demurrer to the petition. The status and meaning of
Schafer were clearly'in question following Huggins. That case con-
tains extraordinary dicta with reference to the requirements which
must be satisfied for a litigant to rely on res ipsa loquitur.2 4 These
requirements have never been followed and would require a de-
tailed enumeration of the factors establishing res ipsa loquitur
and exclusive control. Fortunately, this language has now been
clarified by the court in Oberlin v. Friedman,2 5 and it is now
clearly recognized that the inference of res ipsa loquitur may be
raised from the evidence in the case, irrespective of the contents
of the pleadings.
Subsequent to Oberlin, Price v. Dot's Super Market, TncY'
presented a difficult factual pattern for the application of res ipsa
loquitur. The defendant owned a supermarket which was being
extensively remodeled at the time of plaintiff's mishap. Flooring
had been removed and then temporarily replaced. At the suggestion
of the contractor, defendant endeavored to attach cleats to the
individual boards in order to keep them stationary, since the store
remained open during remodeling, and substantial numbers of
customers walked over the previously loosened boards. Plaintiff
was injured when one of the boards gave way causing her to fall
into the aperture thus created. The majority of the court applied
Renneckar, without any mention of Schafer, and reasoned that it
was as reasonable to infer that the board was dislodged by the
act of a customer as to "infer negligence on the part of the defend-
ant." The court then held that the "possibility of two reasonable
inferences precludes application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine."21
(Emphasis added.) Judge Herbert's dissent, however, discussed ex-
clusive control in new terms, stating it had come to mean "power or
right to control and the opportunities to exercise that control .... ,,28
23 176 Ohio St. 171, 198 N.E.2d 448 (1964). The Huggins case also involved a
joinder question which has now been resolved by the repeal of Oino REVISED COz,
§ 2309.06. For this reason, Judge Herbert concurred in the decision.
24 Id. at 183, 198 N.E.2d at 456.
25 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E.2d 168 (1965).
20 177 Ohio St. 122, 208 N.E.2d 113 (1964).
27 Id. at 124-125. 203 N.E2d at 115.
28 Id. at 128, 203 N.E.2d at 117.
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Judge "Herbert cited Harper, and James, 'Prosser, and the
(then) tentative draft of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS to
support his reasoning. As for Ohio precedents, he was confined to
Schafer and the overrulng of the motion to certify in Gusumano
v. Beverages, Inc.,29 which will be discussed below. He commented
that
Admittedly, the element of 'exclusive control' was strictly con-
strued during the original development of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur. The modem trend of authorities, however, reject
such strict interpretation.... Further, this court has rejected
any such strict construction.3 0
In the limited context of res ipsa loquitur, Price seems to be
governed by Renneckar, since third persons came into contact
with the instrumentality in question. An alternative theory, how-
ever, might have avoided the problems presented in Price. There
are some circumstances under which an owner of property has
the duty to control his property in order to safeguard visitors. This
body of case law is not dependent upon res ipsa loquitur and
thus does not require an attempt, as in Price, to avoid contrary
case precedents. Cases in Ohio and elsewhere have held that an
owner is required to control his own instrumentalities. The owner
of a business establishment who keeps his doors open during re-
modeling reasonably owes a duty to invitees to be sure that the
boards in his floor are firmly attached. This duty is created by
control or ownership of an instrumentality which has the capacity
to be dangerous, not by an unexplained event which necessitates
an inference based on the assumption that only the defendant may
control or contact the instrumentality. Hundreds of customers
patronize a supermarket. Any one of them may kick or loosen
an unattached floor board, thus raising equal and opposing reason-
able inferences tending to nullify exclusive control. This duty to
control requires a defendant to maintain property or chattels in
such a fashion that third parties who, by common expectation, come
into contact with the property will. not be injured. Price could
be most effectively presented in terms of duty to control, not res
ipsa loquitur. Use of the duty to control doctrine would minimize
the conflict which exists with reference to Schafer and its predeces-
sors.
The Supreme Court returned to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine
29 117 Ohio St. 100, 202 N.E.2d 628 (1964).
30 117 Ohio St. at 127, 203 N.E2d at 117.
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in Oberlin v. Friedman.31 The Oberlin decision follows the ma-
jority rule that res ipsa loquitur will not be applied in malpractice
cases where the injury alone supports the inference of negligence.82
The main significance of the case lies in the area of pleading and
its clarification of some earlier dicta. The court held that res
ipsa loquitur "may be applied even though the petition also
alleges and evidence is offered to prove specific acts of negligence."03
But in discussing exclusive control problems raised in the case,
Chief Justice Taft indicated the restrictions imposed by stare
decisis 'and the lack of interest by a majority of the court in
modifying those views.
A recent exclusive control case which did not reach the
supreme court raised the problem frequently encountered by a
substantial delay between the manufacturing process and injury.84
In this case a Pepsi-Cola carton was delivered and taken directly
to the plaintiff's storeroom by defendant's driver, who placed the
newly delivered cases on top of cartons remaining from previous
deliveries. Two days later, plaintiff endeavored to lift the top
case off the stack; the bottom fell out, and plaintiff was injured.
Plaintiff testified that no one had contacted the cartons between
the time of delivery and injury. Cusumano presents a very difficult
fact situation for application of res ipsa loquitur. The defendant
neither possessed nor managed the cartons after delivery; the
possibility of opposing causative factors was apparent. As noted, the
defendant had no duty to control, since one who delivers a soft
drink cannot regulate the operation of his customer's storeroom.
The extraordinary history of the case demonstrates the difficul-
ties which exist in this area. The accident occurred in 1959. When
the case was first tried, the trial court directed a verdict for the
defendant at the close of plaintiff's case. The appellate court re-
versed and found that "the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is clearly
applicable," 35 without any discussion of res ipsa loquitur or the
supreme court precedents. The supreme court refused to certify
the case.36 At the second trial, the judge charged the jury on res
ipsa loquitur, and a verdict was rendered against defendant. In a
31 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E.2d 168 (1965).
32 See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 489, 154 P. 2d 687 (1954) and comment
thereon at 9 A.L.R. 3rd 1327 (1966).
33 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E.2d 168, 169 (1965) (Syllabus 2).
34 Cusumano v. The Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 9 Ohio App. 2d 105, 223 NE2d
477 (1967).
35 Cusumano v. Beverages, Inc., 95 Ohio L. Abs. 131, 199 N.E.2d 130 (Ct. App,
1964).
26 117 Ohio St. 100, 202 N.E.2d 628 (1964).
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second ' written decision s7 the same court of appeals reversed a
second time, holding that the final argument of plaintiffs counsel
constituted prejudicial error. At this juncture, the court engaged
in an extensive and scholarly review of the exclusive control cases
and presented an analysis which might have led to clarification
had the case been reviewed by the supreme court. But due to a
settlement, no motion to certify was filed with the Ohio Supreme
Court. The doctrine presented by Schafer, Morrell and Price thus
remains contradictory.
At the conclusion of its review of cases, the Cusumano court
bravely attempted to reconcile all the significant Ohio cases in-
volving exclusive control:
From a thorough analysis of the above cited cases, we may con-
dude that the trend of Ohio decisions is toward the rule that
actual management and control of the injury-producing instru-
mentality by the defendant is usually required, [citing Koktavy]
but if the instrumentality has been out of the defendant's pos-
session for no more than a reasonable period of time... fdting
Schafer], and the plaintiff can show that the instrumentality has
not been mishandled or tampered with, [citing Huggins] and
there is no probability that any other intervening force had an
effect on the instrumentality [citing Renneckar], then the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur will be applicable.38
The court then added that, "Furthermore, many prominent com-
mentators on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur advocate flexible
interpretation of the element of 'control' and counsel against
a rigorous enforcement of a literal interpretation."89
The plaintiff in a Cusumano-type case will find it difficult
to -satisfy the requirements established by the Cusumano court;
i.e., is there no probability that any other intervening force has had
an effect on the instrumentality?40 Furthermore, the causation sup-
ported by the flexible 'interpretation still faces a sharply divided
supreme court. The unknown factor is the degree of probability
by which the chance of an intervening cause must be eliminated in
a divided control case. The revised RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF
TORTS simply requires that "other responsible causes, including the
conduct of the plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated
by the evidence."' (Emphasis added.) Under the REsrATEMENT,
37 9 Ohio App. 2d 105, 223 N.E.2d 477 (1967).
38 Id. at 112, 228 N.E.2d at 480.
39 Id. at 112, 228 N.E2d at 482. In this connection the court dted PROSSM and
HARPER & JAmEs; and the then adopted REsTATEm Er 2D.
40 9 Ohio App. 2d 105, 228 N.E.2d 477 (1967) (Syllabus 1).
41 RESTATEM FNr 2D § 328D (1966).
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the Cusumano case would be submitted to a jury. Given the Ohio
precedents, however, judgment for the defendant would be likely
if a case such as this were decided by the supreme court.
III. MODIFICATION OF EXCLUSIVE CONTROL
As noted previously, most commentators have indicated strong
preference for modification of the exclusive control doctrine.42
Harper and James are unequivocal in their criticism of a strict
application of the exclusive control requirement. They state,
The requirement of proof of exclusive control is immediately
seen to impose too strict a burden upon plaintiffs. Exclusive
control may have the required logical tendency, but there are
also many other ways (not involving exclusive control) in which
the probable negligence can be attributed to the defendant.
And, in effect, the courts do not generally apply this require-
ment as is literally stated, although mechanical insistence upon
it has brought about an occasional restrictive result . . . the
fallacy of the 'exclusive control' test is seen in many situations
where the doctrine is unhesitatingly applied despite absence of
'control'.48
The RESTATEMENT draft, urged by Judge Herbert in Price,
has now been adopted in the revised RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS. 44 The pertinent subsection is, of course, section
328D (1) (b) which requires "sufficient elimination" of "other
responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons . . . ." This revised language completely discontinues use
of the exclusive control standard and requires merely a rational
elimination of other opposing explanations. The official comments
to the RESTATEMENT would seem to indicate that the requirement
is really that of a logical probability. If plaintiff establishes that
it is more probable that his harm was caused by the defendant's
negligence than by the conduct of third persons, the case should
42 HARPER AND JAMES, PRosSm, and RFvrATEMFNT 2D.
43 HARPER AND JAMEs, at 1085-1087.
44 § 328D. Res Ipsa Loquitur.
(I) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is caused by negligence
of the defendant when
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence
of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including -the conduct of the plaintiff and third
persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; (Emphasis added.)
and




be submitted to the jury.45 In this connection the RESTATEMENT
utilizes the driverless vehicle hypothetical, which will be discussed
below, and notes that when a car runs down a hill two minutes
after being parked by its owner,
In the absence of other evidence, the explanation is possible that
some meddling stranger has tampered with the car, or that it
has been struck by another vehicle. It may, however, be reason-
ably inferred that, more probably than not, the event occurred
because of the negligence of A in parking the car."6
Even blanket use of the RESTATEMENT language will not avoid
difficulties in promulgating a uniform body of decisions on any-
thing other than an ad hoc basis. The distinctions between a mere
possibility and a reasoned probability are not governed by scientific
precision. In any event, the writers of the RESTATEMENT have demon-
strated their own desire to avoid continued use of the exclusive con-
trol standard.47 Section 328D is so new that it is difficult to predict
how widely it may be adopted by courts considering exclusive
control problems. The only specific application of section 328D
mentioned in the RESTATEMENT itself was from a dissenting opin-
ion. 4S
At this point clarification in Ohio is badly needed. First, it
must be determined in a borderline case similar to Cusumano,
which does not directly fall into a previously litigated category,
whether exclusive control means complete control or something
like the sufficient elimination standard of the revised RESTATEMKENT
(SECOND) OF ToRTS. Second, the affirmative duty to control doc-
trine, previously alluded to in the discussion of Price, can mitigate
some of the problems raised by exclusive control and should be
utilized in fact situations to which it is properly applicable.
(2) It is the function of the court to determine whether the inference may rea-
sonably be drawn by the jury, or whether it must necessarily be drawn.
(3) It is the function of the jury to determine whether the inference is to be
drawn in any case where different conclusions may reasonably be reached.
45 RESrATEMENT 2D § 160, comment on Clause (b) of Sub.sec. (1).
46 Id.
47 Id. § 160 comment g.
It is not, however, necessary to the inference that the defendant have such
exclusive control; exclusive control is merely one way of proving his responsi-
bility ... if it can be established otherwise, exclusive control is not essential
to a res ipsa loquitur case. The essential question becomes one of whether the
probable cause is one which the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff
to anticipate or guard against.
48 Milligan v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Ogden, 11 Utah 2d 30, 354 P.2d 580. 583
(1960). Obviously, the annotation is not current since Judge Herbert, as indicated
above, cited the RESrATEMENT 2D's draft in Price.
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IV. DUTY TO CONTROL,--MOVING VEHICLES
A review of cases involving moving vehicles can aptly demon-
strate the confusion created' when the distinction between res ipsa
loquitur and affirmative duty to control is not clearly kept in mind.
This revie* will also indicate the availability in cases presenting
occurrences of uncertain origin of helpful doctrines, other than res
ipsa'loquitur.
Res ipsa loquitur has been frequently applied in Ohio. and
other jurisdictions in moving vehicle cases. Courts generally have
reasoned that since automobiles do not ordinarily move about of
their own volition, the fact that one has moved and caused an
injury while under the defendant's control justifies inferring neg-
ligence in the absence of other explanatory evidence.49
Hudson v. Bennettr0 an appellate court case decided after
Soltz and before Koktavy, would appear to be in conflict with both
of those decisions.51 Here, the defendant was conducting an auction
of automobiles owned by various third parties; he parked the cars
on a hill and set the brakes but left the keys in the ignition. The
cars were not owned by defendant; they were consigned for the
auction and returned to their owners at the conclusion of the
auction if not sold. Prospective purchasers were accorded the
privilege of examiiing the' cars, starting the motor and driving the
cars. Plaintiff was driving along the highway adjacent to the
property in question and was struck by a driverless vehicle which
had coasted down the hill from defendant's parking lot. Plaintiff
could not prove who had parked the automobile. Nevertheless, the
court upheld a verdict for plaintiff for 1,200 dollars for property
damages, holding that res ipsa loquitur applied.
The decision of the court is interesting because it partially
recognizes the duty to control rationale but fails to separate that
doctrine from res ipsa loquitur.52 The court reasoned that the
'defendant company was obligated to exercise proper care in that
49 See Annot., 16 AiL.R.2d 979, 984 (1951). In Ohio, the syllabus in Ice Cream
Co. v. Call, 28 Ohio App. 521, 162 N.E. 812 (1928), states that:
Where a loaded automobile truck, while on owner's business, runs wild with-
out a driver, causing injury and damage, ,the doctrine oE res ipsa loquitur ap-
plies, rendering such owner liable for damage caused by the runaway truck.
50 94 Ohio App. 329, 115 N.W.2d 20 (1952).
51 "Liberties with 'exclusive control' were also taken by the appellate court it
Hudson v. Bennett!" Survey of Ohio Law 1953: Res ipsa Loquitur, 5 W. REs. L. REV.
315 (1953).
52 Cf. Price v. Dot's Super Market, Inc., 117 Ohio St. 122, 125, 203 N.E.2d 115,
115 (1964) (dissenting opinion of Herbert, J.).
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they had the sole right and control over the use of the vehicles. The
fact that the company had no knowledge of who actually failed
to set the brakes was deemed irrelevant in view of the company's
implied control of the automobile and apparent opportunity to
prevent mishaps.53 Whether the court was thinking in terms of
exclusive control or exclusive right and duty to control is impossible
to ascertain from the wording of the decision. This decision is con-
sistent in its holding with decisions based upon duty to control. But
since the defendant did not have exclusive control of the automobile
involved, the case is not consistent with Ohio res ipsa loquitur
decisions. The supreme court denied a motion to certify the case,
which is unfortunate from the standpoint of uniformity since that
court would probably have followed Soltz and Rennecker by revers-
ing the decision of the lower court and granting judgment for the
defendant.5 4
Review of decisions from other jurisdictions is helpful at this
point. Litos -v. Sullivan5 5 illustrates complete reliance on the duty
to control doctrine. Defendant parked his car on a fifteen percent
grade at 10 a m. in the morning. Between 1 and 2 p.m. defendant
noticed, while passing his car, that one of his rear tires was flat.
He had, it repaired immediately by a garage repairman. At ap-
proximately 3:30 p.m.; the automobile coasted down the hill and
struck plaintiff. At trial, verdicts were rendered against both the
owner and the garage. Although the logic of the decision to
exonerate the garage would seem open to question, the decision
is significant since it deals entirely with the duty to control and
does not mention res ipsa loquitur. The court held that one who
parks a car where it might tend to move has the duty to see that the
car is properly secured. Since the decision deals with specific (non-
inferential) negligence and the only evidence with respect to parking
the car was that offered by the owner who testified that he cau-
tiously parked the car in reverse and cramped his wheels, the court
permitted the jury to disbelieve the only direct evidence and to
infer specific negligence (i.e., failure to properly park) from the
actual fact of the rolling car.50
Cases involving garages who have temporary custody of auto-
mobiles, brought in for service, also apply the duty to control
53 Hudson v. Bennett, 94 Ohio App. 329, 333-34, 115 N.E2d 20, 22-23 (1952).
54 Ice Cream Co. v. Call, 28 Ohio App. 521, 162 N.E. 812 (1928). It is intersLing
to note that the older Call decision, also involving a rolling vehicle, would seem to
fall more appropriately into the duty of control category.
55 322 Mass. 193, 76 N.E2d 557 (1947).
56 Id. at 195, 76 N.E2d at 558.
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doctrine. For example, in Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Martin1
a customer of a service station brought a car in to be serviced. She
testified at the trial that she parked the car, placed it in gear and
left. Neither defendant nor any of its agents in any way moved or
touched the car before it rolled out of the service station and struck
plaintiff. The court held that although no control had been exer-
cised over the vehicle, defendant had the affirmative duty to check
the car and to make sure that it was securely braked.58 In effect,
the decision applies the doctrine of strict liability: One who works
on cars cannot rely upon their owners to properly secure them
and must take affirmative action to prevent them from injuring
third parties.
Another area of significant development concerning moving
vehicles involves what might be colloquially termed as the "picnic
grove" cases. In Marquardt v. Orlowski59 the accident occurred at
a crowded picnic ground over the Fouth of July weekend. Defend-
ant A arrived and parked his car on a hill pursuant to the direction
of the owner of the picnic grove, defendant B, who made a charge
of one dollar for this parking privilege. Thereafter, and while de-
fendant A was at his picnic table, his four year old daughter climbed
into the unlocked automobile and apparently disengaged the gears.
The car, daughter aboard, rolled downhill and struck plaintiff,
resulting in the loss of plaintiff's leg. The court held the owner of
the picnic grove, defendant B, liable to plaintiff for their "total
failure to provide a safe parking place . . . or to take any measures
directed toward proper supervision, direction and control of auto
parking."60 The decision again imposes a high duty of care on an
owner of property whose business it is to permit motor vehicles to be
parked or utilized on his property. The evidence indicated that the
hand brake on the car was inoperative and had not been set by
defendant A. Nevertheless, the court judicially noticed that the
practice of "hillside" parking lot owners was to utilize barriers,
such as logs and railroad ties, to prevent vehicles from rolling.01
The Orlowski reasoning has been adopted by the Court of
Appeals for Columbiana County in Holdshoe v. Whiner, 602 which
involved a similar fact situation. That court, citing Orlowski, held
that parking of vehicles on an incline was a potential hazard and
57 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995 (1949).
58 Id. Syllabi 3 and 4.
59 18 Ill. App. 2d 135, 151 N.E.2d 109 (1958).
60 Id. at 142-45, 151 N.E.2d at 113-14.
61 Id. at 144, 151 N.E.2d at 114.
62 8 Ohio App. 2d 305, 222 N.E.2d 435 (1966).
[Vol. 29
RES IPSA LOQUITUR
the owner of this hilly terrain was obligated to provide adequate
safety features in his lot.08 Defendant charged visitors fifty cents for
the use of picnic tables but made no general charge for admission
to his property upon which other facilities were located. No separ-
ate, distinct parking area was provided for picnic patrons. Thus,
individual picnickers generally parked adjacent to their own
tables. In Orlowski, a one dollar charge was made at the time the
patrons were admitted to the grounds and there was some testimony,
in that case, to the effect that the attendant told defendant, at least
in a general sort of way, to park on the hill. The petition in Hold-
shoe 4 was phrased entirely in terms of specific negligence and
charged the defendant with six distinct negligent acts. Neither the
trial court nor the court of appeals made any reference to res
ipsa loquitur in promulgating their respective decisions.
Although the picnic grove decisions represent minority law,
they seem harmonious with the reasoning behind the duty to
control doctrine. The Supreme Court of Ohio has certified Holdshoe
and, although the court of appeals' decision does not deal with res
ipsa loquitur, its eventual disposition may indicate the predilections,
if any, of the supreme court to modify its restrictions on exclusive
control.* It would appear somewhat inconsistent to continue con-
fining exclusive control in the Price mold to definite certainty if the
analogous duty to control doctrine is to be extended to the outer
perimeter represented by Holdshoe. Nevertheless, it is important to
recognize that the Holdshoe fact situation should logically be dis-
cussed solely in terms of duty to control.
V. DUTY TO COIROL-MISCELLANEOUS
Recent decisions on subjects other than moving vehicles demon-
strate the distinction between res ipsa loquitur and the duty to
control doctrines and the importance of recognizing the existence
of the latter doctrine. In jurisdictions other than Ohio, cases con-
cerning fires have involved both modifications of the exclusive con-
trol requirement and occasional recognition of the duty to control.6 5
Dubuque Fire & Marine Insurance Co. v. Union Compress &
W. Co.66 indicates the difficulty in attempting to separate res ipsa
loquitur and duty to control. In Dubuque, the fire occurred in stor-
03 Id. at 310, 222 N.E.2d at 439.
64 See Supreme Court of Ohio, Case No. 40,782 (filed Feb. 21, 1967) and, par-
ticularly, Appellant's brief therein.
65 See Annot., 8 A.L.R. 3d 974, 999 rm. 12 & 13 (1966) ; Oakdale Building Corpor-
ation v. Smithereen Co., 322 Ill. App. 222, 54 N.E2d 321 (1944).
66 143 F. Supp. 128 (W.D. La. 1956).
* Ct. of App. affirmed by Su. Ct. in 14 Ohio St. 2d 134 (May 1968).-E
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age barns and destroyed 500,000 dollars worth of cotton. The fire
was apparently caused by spontaneous combustion in the bales of
stored cotton. The district court applied res ipsa loquitur, although
individuals other than agents of defendant had free access to the
barns, finding "that this is a classic case of application of the doc-
trine."67 But the court immediately hedged its categorical selection
of a "classic" doctrine by asserting that even if they were mistaken
in applying the doctrine, there was sufficient evidence to show that
defendant had been negligent in failing to properly patrol the
building aisles and remove "fire bales."' 8
Res ipsa loquitur has also been utilized to impose liability upon
bailors of motor vehicles. The courts often speak in terms of raising
an inference of negligence when there is a duty owing not to permit
a defective vehicle to be operated by another.0 Many of these cases
appear to inadvertently combine res ipsa loquitur and the affirma-
tive duty to control. Contrast this with Dubuque, which clearly
recognized the distinction between specific negligence and the in.
ference of general negligence. As indicated above, section 328D of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS mentions' the scope of the
defendant's duty to plaintiff but solely within the context of res
ipsa loquitur. One mightquestion whether the 'RESTATEME.NT recog-
nizes the distinction between res ipsa loquitur and duty to control.
Yarbrough v. Ball U-Drive SySiem 7° is a leading bailment case
in which plaintiff's decedent was killed when the rear end of a
leased truck flew into' the aircausing the truck to overturn. The
court held that there was ample proof' to submit the case under
res ipsa loquitur, logically finding that one renting automobiles or
vehicles "represents that the vehicles are in good mechanical con-
dition.' 71 The court's decision, however, is phrased entirely in
terms of res ipsa loquitur rather than in the more appropriate con,
text of duty to control. This treatment necessitated a somewhat
artificial disposition of the exclusive control requirement, which
would not have been necessary if the case had been determined by
the more obvious duty to control doctrine.
There are, of course, some areas in which either relaxation of
the exclusive control test, or application of the duty to control doc-
trine, are more proper than others. One of the most controversial
subjects involves suits against hospitals, particularly those involving
67 Id. at 134.
68 Id. at 135-36.
69 See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 404, 411 (1956).
70 48 So. 2d 82 (Fla. 1950).
71 Id. at 83.
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simultaneous care and treatment, as in an operation by a team of
doctors and nurses who may or may not be employees or agents
of each other or the hospital in question.7 2 This field has created
abundant litigation.7 3 One commentator found a "considerable
relaxation, in hospital injury cases as to what constitutes an 'instru-
mentality' or its 'control,' for purposes of the new res ipsa loquitur
rule."74 An older example of this relaxing influence is Ybarra v.
Spangard.75 In that case plaintiff noticed a sharp pain between his
neck and shoulder following an appendectomy. He was unable to
even tentatively identify the instrumentality, doctor, nurse, or
anaesthesiologist who presumably created the pain. The Supreme
Court of California held it was sufficient for the plaintiff to show
injury resulting from an external force which had been applied
while he was unconscious since this was "as clear a case of identifi-
cation of the instrumentality as the plaintiff may ever be able to
make."76
The difficulties in providing reasonable certainty can be seen
by considering Rinkel v. Lees Plumbing & Heating Co.7  This
decision predates the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS and its
drafts, but it relies upon and adopts language similar to section
328D.78 In Rinkel plumbing was installed in a home in April. In
December some of the new fixtures burst while the owners were
absent on vacation. Suit .was instituted against the plumbing
contractor.
Held, although other causes could conceivably have caused the
separation of the pipes, under the circumstances here, the prob-
ability of this was not greater than nor equal to the probability
that negligence in installation by defendant's employee ulti-
mately caused the separation. 79
This court merely required the plaintiff to reasonably eliminate
other causes, and held that "exclusive control in the defendant is
not necessarily a prerequisite to the application of res ipsa loqui-
tur."' 0 The court cited an earlier Minnesota decision and concluded
72 The leading Ohio case is Oberlin v. Friedman, 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E_2d 168
(1965).
73 See Annot., 9 A.L.R. d 1315 (1966).
74 Id. at n. 1321.
75 25 Cal2d 486, 154 P.2d 687 (1944).
76 Id. at 498, 154 P-2d at 690-91.
77 257 Minn. 14, 99 N.W.2d 779 (1959).
78 Id. at 18, 99 N.W.2d at 782.
79 Id. at 14, 99 N.W.2d at 780 (Syllabus 2).
80 Id. at 18, 99 N.AV.2d at 782.
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that the decision as to when res ipsa loquitur should be applied is
"largely a question of how justice in such cases is most practically
and fairly administered."81
VI. PRAcTIcAL TuAL PROBLEMS
There are two other problems which relate to previous examples
and merit brief discussion: May a pleader rely on res ipsa loquitur
if he pleads specific acts of negligence? If so, may such pleader
successfully request the trial court to charge the jury simultaneously
on (a) the inference created by res ipsa loquitur and (b) specific
doctrines of negligence raised by the pleadings, such as the duty
to control? The answer to the first question in Ohio, as elsewhere, is
clearly in the affirmative.8 2 The answer to the second question is
undetermined.
As noted above, Oberlin expressly holds that res ipsa loquitur
may be applied "even though the petition also alleges and evidence
is offered to prove specific acts of negligence."88 The Oberlin case
required the disapproval of previous dictum in Winslow v. Ohio
Bus Line Co.814 and clarified an area which, at that time, was still
in doubt. Part of the confusion prior to Oberlin was created by a
statement in Ohio jurisprudence, Second which stated, "The doc-
trine [of res ipsa loquitur] is inapplicable where the complaint
alleged and plaintiff affirmatively attempted to show how his injur-
ies were inflicted. 8 5 As evidenced by the footnote which purports to
support it, that sentence is based upon a misinterpretation of
Seiling v. Mahrer.8 6 In that case, the court declined to apply res
ipsa loquitur in a medical malpractice action and followed the
general rule to the effect that res ipsa loquitur does not apply to
this subject matter. Thus Seiling applies only in a narrow area and
should not be cited, without clarification, as supporting a general
rule.8 7
There is a surprising absence of either case precedent or
scholarly comment dealing with the subject of proper instructions
81 Peterson v. Minnesota Power & Light Co., 207 Minn. 387, 891, 291 N.W. 705,
707 (1940).
82 Oberlin v. Friedman, 5 Ohio St. 2d 1, 213 N.E.2d 168 (1965).
83 Id. Syllabus 2.
84 148 Ohio St. 101, 73 N.E.2d 504 (1947).
85 39 0. JuR. 2D Negligence § 159 (1959).
86 71 Ohio L. Abs. 571, 113 N.E.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1953).
87 Cases prior to Oberlin permitted joint pleading of res ipsa loquitur and specific
negligence. See Williamson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp,, 213 F2d 246 (6th Cir.




to the jury in cases that involve simultaneous application of res
ipsa loquitur and specific acts of negligence. Clearly, in Ohio the
right to rely on res ipsa loquitur is not precluded by pleading and
endeavoring to prove specific acts of negligence. There is, how-
ever, real question as to whether the case may be submitted to the
jury on both issues. The better position is that the case can be
submitted to the jury on the issues of res ipsa loquitur and specific
acts of negligence.
If an election were required, several practical problems would
be raised. First, if an election between the issues were required
when would the election be made? If the plaintiff had to elect before
resting his case he might not know at that time whether the court
would submit the case on res ipsa loquitur. Accordingly, if the
election were to select res ipsa loquitur, a bad guess would result
in a directed verdict. Second, although the pleadings are no longer
submitted to the jury, reference is frequently made to them during
the trial and most particularly, during the court's charge. If the
plaintiff were required, in effect, to elect res ipsa loquitur and
drop his claims of specific negligence, the court or counsel might
well comment on that subject. The jury might then infer that the
plaintiffs entire action was groundless since not all of his claims
could be substantiated.
Since res ipsa loquitur is an inference, it is reasonable to permit
that inference to be supported or weakened by all of the relevant
evidence submitted during the trial, including specific acts of
negligence. Conversely, it is unreasonable for a jury to be required
to consider that inference in a vacuum, without the supporting
evidence which endeavors to indicate precisely what the defendant
failed or neglected to do. Under the approach of submitting both
issues to the jury the charge would be:
You are instructed that this case is an action in which the doc-
trine of res ipsa loquitur might be applied. The words, 'res ipsa
loquitur', mean the 'thing itself speaks'. In other words, the
rule of res ipsa loquitur means that the circumstances involved
in or connected with an accident may be of such unusual char-
acter as to justify, in the absence of any other evidence bearing
on the subject, the inference that the accident was due to negli-
gence because, in the absence of any explanation that would be
a fair and reasonable condusion.88 You are further instructed
that in considering whether that inference of negligence should
be applied in this case, you may consider all the evidence sub-
mitted in this action by both the plaintiff and the defendant,
88 See 4 RimD's BRAN,,soN I.NsmucioNs To JunRs-Cavm Acrnoxs § 2335, at 408
(1962).
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including the evidence introduced by plaintiff dealing with the
subject of specific charges of negligence and the defendant's
evidence in defense thereof.
This approach is generally called the "surplus theory." 8 This
doctrine has been described as the "most logical" on the ground
that it recognizes the true nature of an inference, which is strength-
ened by the addition of other facts consistent with the inference.00
The previously cited Dubuque case 1 relates to this problem; that
court found a classic case for the application of res ipsa loquitur
but alternatively found the commission of specific negligent acts.
VII. CONCLUSION
Res ipsa loquitur can continue to speak for itself when the oc-
currence in question is genuinely an unexplained mystery. But if
the accident involves potentially dangerous items which should be
controlled by their owners to prevent foreseeable injury, reliance
upon res ipsa loquitur may be both inappropriate and confusing.
The failure to exercise proper control is not an unexplained event.
Liability is based upon the basic tort principle of ordinary care
under all the lapplicable circumstances, not upon reliance on a
legalized latin proverb which was developed to prevent injustice
in cases where affirmative evidence was not available.
* Res ipsa loquitur will continue to be an important tort doc-
trine. However, problems incidental to the application of this
unique inference should be minimized by confining it to cases
involving truly unexplained events. Since res ipsa loquitur is' an
old doctrine involving a substantial body of precedent, which fre-
quently establishes strict standards of exclusive control, it may
sometimes be easier to urge modification through the duty to con-
trol standard. This latter doctrine is reasonably new in most
instances and often has not been recognized at all as a separate tort
doctrine which establishes a standard of care on its own right.
In many ways the duty to control cases appear similar to decisions in
the products liability field with reference to the duty to warn.02
A manufacturer of products must warn purchasers of latent defects
which have the capacity to cause injury when the product sold
is used in a foreseeable manner. Similarly, a person who has the
power to control an instrumentality which may cause injury if
misused must take reasonable steps to prevent such injury.
89 See Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 1335, 1341 (1965).
90 Id. at 1341.
91 143 F.Supp. 128 (W.D. La. 1956).
92 See Annot., 76 A.L.R.2d 9 (1961).
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